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Developing environmental law scholarship: going beyond the legal 
space 
Professor Gavin Little, Stirling Law School, University of Stirling 
 
Abstract 
Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange, Eloise Scotford and Cinnamon 
Carlarne have delivered a hard but justified message: environmental 
law scholarship is still perceived by many in the field as immature, 
and this is a reflection of the methodological challenges posed by its 
subject. This article expands on their argument that scholars should 
think more closely about what can be learnt from debates about 
method in the wider legal mainstream and interdisciplinarity as part 
of the process of developing the discipline. It locates what is called 
‘classic’ and ‘novel’ environmental law scholarship at the margins of 
the legal academy, which is conceptualised as an imagined legal 
‘space’. The article then explores the ways in which insights derived 
from the environmental humanities and sciences can invigorate and 
mature environmental law scholarship by creating exciting new inter-
disciplinary contexts for the development of legal research methods. 
 
1. Introduction 
In their 2009 paper ‘Maturity and methodology: starting a debate 
about environmental law scholarship’, Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina 
Lange, Eloise Scotford and Cinnamon Carlarne1 shine an 
                                                          
 
1 E Fisher, B Lange, E Scotford, C Carlane, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate About Environmental 
Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21(2) Journal of Environmental Law, 213 (henceforth ‘Fisher et al’). The debate has 
been continued in R Macrory ‘Maturity and methodology: a personal reflection’ (2009) Journal of 
Environmental Law 251; O Pederson ‘Modest Pragmatic Lessons for a Diverse and Incoherent Environmental 
Law’ (2013) 33/1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 103; J McEldowney and S McEldowney ‘Science and 
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uncompromising light on a vital issue for environmental law scholars 
in the UK.  They argue that concern about the immaturity of the 
discipline – something which many in the field recognise – is largely 
caused by the methodological challenges which environmental law 
presents to legal scholars, such as the speed and scale of change, 
interdisciplinarity, diverse perspectives on governance and multiple 
jurisdictions.2 It follows from this that UK environmental law scholars 
should, among other things, engage in a constructive debate about 
legal methodology and interdisciplinarity, for it is by doing so that 
the difficulties inherent in the subject can be met head on and it can 
achieve its potential as an academic specialism.3 
 
The objective of this article is to contribute to the debate initiated by 
Fisher et al by developing a meta-level concept of UK legal 
scholarship, which is envisioned as a ‘legal space’: at the core of this 
space is research into the activities of judges, courts and  legislators 
and the analysis of legal principle.  It is then argued that, because of 
reasons inherent in its subject matter, environmental law research 
can be characterised as a spectrum ranging from ‘classic’ to ‘novel’ 
scholarship.  The former is concerned with evaluating conventional 
legal issues such as tort or judicial review in an environmental 
context, while the latter seeks to analyse how governance and 
regulation interact with often highly polycentric environmental 
                                                          
environmental law: collaboration across the double helix’ (2011) Environmental Law Review 169; L Fisher 
‘Environmental Law as ‘Hot’ Law’ (2013) 25(3) Journal of Environmental Law 347; O Pederson ‘The Limits of 
Interdisciplinarity and the Practice of Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2014) Journal of Environmental Law 
423; and N Graham ‘This is Not a Thing: Land, Sustainability and Legal Education’ (2014) Journal of 
Environmental Law 395.  
2 Fisher et al briefly consider a range of reasons why environmental law scholarship might be perceived as 
immature: the intellectual incoherence of the subject; the perceived marginality of the scholarship, the poor 
quality of some of it and the inherent difficulties of the subject. They then argue that perceptions of 
immaturity really reflect the methodological challenges of the subject. Fisher et al, ibid, pp 218-243. 
3 Fisher et al also suggest that environmental law scholars should think more about the relationship between 
method and research questions, mapping the subject and having a more explicit debate about the quality of 
scholarship. Ibid, p 215 and pp 244-249. 
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themes and phenomena, such as climate change.  Classic 
environmental law scholarship is, given its subject matter, derivative 
of other specialisms at or near the core of legal space.  It is a small 
field of study relative to major core subjects and, in comparative 
terms, lacks academic critical mass.  Novel environmental law 
scholarship is also, given its weak relationship with the world of 
judges, courts and legal principle, located at the margins of the legal 
space and can be characterised as being derivative of the wider field 
of governance studies.  
 
Environmental law scholarship’s relative lack of academic heft and 
intellectual distinctiveness, and its marginal status in the legal space 
– or in Fisher et al’s terms, its immaturity – highlights the value of 
developing deeper connections with other environmental disciplines, 
and with science in particular.  Utilising legal knowledge to enrich 
other environmental disciplines has the potential to give both classic 
and novel environmental law scholarship stronger, less derivative 
intellectual identities and can also deepen understanding of what 
makes legal scholarship valuable within the legal academy itself.  The 
article then explores how this process can be taken forward, focusing 
on how environmental law scholars can develop exciting new 
interdisciplinary perspectives on the use of legal research methods 
by drawing on recent initiatives linking the environmental 
humanities with science. 
 
2. Legal scholarship as ‘legal space’ 
Environmental law scholarship, like all legal scholarship, exists in a 
broader context.  How can this be imagined?  It is surely reasonable 
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to say that the majority of UK legal academics research and teach 
different aspects of the inter-related worlds of courts, tribunals, 
judges, lawyers, legislators and regulators.  This is so irrespective of 
their subject specialisms and whether they define themselves as 
socio-legal, doctrinal, comparative, critical, feminist, jurisprudential 
or historical scholars.4 Their main primary source materials are 
legislation, precedent and other legal instruments – that is, law itself5 
– and official sources such as government reports.6  Their secondary 
sources are comprised largely of the scholarship of fellow legal 
academics.  And their general objective is to develop what Neil 
MacCormick termed ‘legal knowledge’ which results ‘from 
interpretative inquiry into law’, whether conceptual, substantively 
focussed7 or empirical.8   
 
It is this collective scholarly activity which, taken together, comprises 
what is called the ‘legal space’. The concept draws loosely on the 
idea of ‘regulatory space’, which is a way of envisaging the complex 
interrelationships of competing organisations within regulatory 
systems.9  Within this imagined academic meta-space, there is, 
rather than regulatory bodies, a wide variety of different and 
sometimes inter-connected subject sub-spaces which themselves 
                                                          
4 Or law and economics scholars, governance scholars, etc.: for discussion of the main approaches to 
scholarship utilised in UK legal academia, see F Cownie Legal Academics: Culture and Identities (Oxford and 
Portland: Hart, 2004) pp 49-72. See also C McCrudden ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) LQR 632. 
5 The idea of legal scholarship as being primarily concerned with legal rules is particularly strong in the context 
of positivist, doctrinal research: see JN Adams and R Brownsword Understanding Law (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1999) p 30. 
6 For example, official reports which provide socio-legal scholars with data on how law and legal processes 
operate. 
7 N MacCormick Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford: OUP; 2007) p 290.  See chapters 10-13 
for analysis of the nature of the legal knowledge which has been built up in these different areas. 
8 Ibid, pp 299-300. 
9See further on regulatory space, L Hancher and M Moran ‘Organising Regulatory Space’ in L Hancher and M 
Moran (eds) ‘Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) pp 276-279; and C 
Scott, ‘Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design’ (2001) PL 329. 
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divide into a multitude of specialisms.10  Some of these are relatively 
large, such as tort, contract, family law, EU law and public law, while 
others - such as environmental law - have only small numbers of 
scholars working in the field.  As expanded on below, scholars also 
utilise a wide range of research methods to develop different types 
of legal knowledge in the many and various sub-spaces and 
specialisms of the legal space. 
 
The core dynamics of the legal space  
Before focusing on environmental law scholarship, the fundamental 
dynamics of the wider legal space should be explored.  
Environmental law research does not exist in an intellectual vacuum 
and reflecting on its context brings some important issues into 
sharper relief.  How then is the legal space configured internally?  Its 
core is surely the analysis of the work of senior judges, the courts 
(particularly the supreme courts) and legislators in the largest and 
most highly developed subject sub-spaces. This is, self-evidently, the 
pre-eminent activity in UK legal scholarship. Judges and courts, 
through the common law, statutory interpretation and the operation 
of the justice system, have long exercised great power and 
responsibility in creating, developing and enforcing the law of the 
land in core subject areas such as criminal law, public law, family law, 
property law, contract, tort, and company and commercial law: 
much legal scholarship is therefore focussed on studying this. The 
                                                          
10 For example, private law scholarship encompasses tort, restitution, contract, the law of persons, property 
law, trust law, succession law, company and commercial law, employment law and the law of actions.  Public 
law scholarship, among other things, includes in its subject matter the law of EU institutions, UK constitutional 
law, local government law, revenue law, administrative law, the law governing the legal system and human 
rights law.  Criminal law scholarship analyses not only law which defines and governs individual crimes, but 
also the laws of criminal evidence, procedure and process.   See MacCormick, above n 7, p 290. For a critical 
analysis of the tendency of legal education to divide the study of law into separate sub-disciplines, thereby 
blocking integrated thinking about law’s relationship with the environment, see Graham, above n 1, pp 405-
413. 
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analysis of legislation in these areas, which often builds on common 
law principle and is mediated and implemented by the courts, is also 
a key activity for legal scholars. 
 
Moreover, because the core subjects are the main areas of legal 
practice, they are compulsory in professionally accredited 
undergraduate law degrees, the delivery of which is the staple 
business of most modern UK law schools.11  The majority of 
academics teaching them, most of whom are themselves graduates 
of law schools,12 naturally develop research specialisms in them:  the 
significance of the symbiosis of research and professionally 
accredited teaching in shaping the internal dynamic of the legal 
space should not be under-estimated.13 And, although scholars 
working in the core subjects are not directly part of the 
interconnected worlds of the senior judiciary, the courts, legislators 
and legal practice, they frequently interact closely with them 
(intellectually if not physically or ideologically and even if they are 
critical of them).  This association with powerful external authority 
figures such as judges and legislators, albeit in a junior role, can be 
                                                          
11 Indeed, Peter Birks went so far as to argue that a ‘sound case can be made for the view that the… [core] 
subjects… are genuinely foundational to the western legal tradition’: see P Birks ‘A Decade of Turmoil in Legal 
Education’ in P Birks (ed) Examining the Law Syllabus:  Beyond the Core (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 
p 10.  Note Anthony Bradney’s contrasting argument that the focus on the requirements of the legal 
profession should be of no particular importance in the provision of a modern, ‘liberal’ legal education: for 
him, it ‘is not what is studied but the manner in which something is studied that matters’: see A Bradney 
Conversations, Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford and Portland: 
Hart, 2003) pp 86-87.  On the sometimes challenging status of the university law school as ‘part of the legal 
profession’ and ‘part of a university’, see R Collier ‘The Changing University and the (Legal) Academic Career – 
Rethinking the Relationship Between Women, Men and the ‘Private Life’ of the Law School’ (2002) 22 JLS 1 at 
p 5. For information on the professionally qualifying subjects for the legal profession in England and Wales and 
Scotland see:  http://www.sra.org.uk/students/academic-stage.page and 
http://www.lawscot.org.uk/education-and-careers/studying-law/currently-studying-the-llb/subjects-you-
need-to-become-a-solicitor/ 
12 For discussion of why law graduates go on to become legal academics, see Cownie, above n 4, pp 79–81. 
13 Indeed, it has long been viewed as being of considerable importance. On the relationship between research 
and teaching in UK law schools, see Bradney, above n 11, pp 110–113 and pp 122–123. 
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said to validate and buttress the status of leading scholars and 
scholarship in these areas.   
 
In this context, the narrow focus of much UK legal scholarship on 
analysing and systematising what is happening within the core 
subjects,14 using a combination of the same techniques of doctrinal 
analysis as those practising law15 and academic methods such as 
socio-legal,16 historical and comparative approaches,17 has raised 
uncomfortable questions about the status of law as an academic 
discipline.  Although the imagery is perhaps pejorative, a large 
proportion of legal scholarship can be viewed as being ‘parasitic on 
practice’:18 much of it is not concerned with the development of new 
knowledge or data, but with the analysis of what key legal decision-
takers have done in order to guide what might happen in the 
future.19  That said, and while for some the derivative relationship 
with legal practice has been indicative of law not being a ‘real’ 
                                                          
14 See N Duxbury Jurists and Judges: an Essay on Influence (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2001), 27; and D Vick ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 JLS 163 at pp 177-180. See also 
Graham, above n 1, pp 409 – 413 for a critical analysis; and P Maharg, Transforming Legal Education 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) p 4.   
15 Doctrinal research is derived from the application of methods used by judges and lawyers in the context of 
legal practice, by which legal rules embodied in statute or precedent can be evaluated ‘to build up a systematic 
statement of the law in acute form, often combined with proposals of how the law can be beneficially 
developed in the future’: Lord Goff ‘Judge, Jurist and Legislature’ (1987) Denning LJ 79 at 92, quoted in Vick, 
ibid, p 178. For further reflection on the internal dynamics of doctrinal scholarship, see also McCrudden, above 
n 4, pp 636-636. 
16 ‘… Socio-legal studies embraces disciplines and subjects concerned with law as a social institution, with the 
social effects of law, legal processes, institutions and services and with the influence of social, political and 
economic factors on the law and legal institutions…..  Socio-legal research is diverse, covering a range of 
theoretical perspectives and a wide variety of empirical research and methodologies. See Socio Legal Studies 
Association Ethics Statement (January 2009), available at: 
http://www.slsa.ac.uk/images/slsadownloads/ethicalstatement/slsa%20ethics%20statement%20_final_%5B1
%5D.pdf (last accessed 3 March 2014). The term socio-legal can also be used more narrowly to mean research 
which only uses social science methods: see for example D Campbell ‘Socio-Legal Analysis of Contract Law’ in P 
Thomas (ed) Socio-Legal Studies (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997) 247. In the UK, the SLSA’s broad church 
definition is now the norm. 
17 For discussion of the mix of methods used in UK legal scholarship, see Cownie, above n 4, pp. 54-57. 
18 WT Murphy and S Roberts ‘Introduction’ (1987) 50 MLR 677 at p 680. 
19 For discussion of the relationship between legal scholarship and practice, see Vick, above n 14, pp 177-181. 
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academic discipline,20 most modern legal academics would now, 
given the high academic quality of the best legal research, feel able 
to acknowledge its importance without qualm. Indeed, writing in 
1996, the late Peter Birks went so far as to say that there would be 
something ‘badly wrong’ if the ‘core of research responsibility’ of the 
modern law school was,  
‘wholly unrelated to, and could be ignored by, the exercise of 
adjudication going on in the courts and the advisory work of 
lawyers which is always ultimately focused on the likely 
outcome of adjudication.’21 
 
Birks’ related inference that doctrinal scholarship remains the ‘true’ 
core of legal scholarship and that other research methods, such as 
socio-legal studies, are therefore peripheral22 can perhaps be left to 
one side. Nowadays, in part because of the wide definition of socio-
legal research developed by the UK Socio-Legal Studies Association 
(‘SLSA’) – it happily embraces a diverse range of perspectives and 
methodologies concerned with law23 - the majority of UK legal 
                                                          
20 Arguably, the connection with legal practice contributed to a lack of self-confidence on the part of some 
legal scholars in the UK relative to their colleagues in more established academic disciplines: see Bradney, 
above n 11, pp 2-17; see also Cownie, above n 4, p 198. The view expressed by Harold Laski, a prominent left 
wing thinker in the 1930s-40s, that most UK legal academics were ‘a very inferior set of people who mainly 
teach because they cannot make a success of the bar’ cast a long shadow: see Duxbury, above n 14, p 71; and 
Bradney, above n 11, pp 2-3. For similarly lacerating views, see T Becher, Academic Tribes and Territories 
(Buckingham: OUP, 1989) p 30: ‘The predominant notion of academic lawyers is that they are not really 
academic… their scholarly activities are thought to be unexciting and uncreative, comprising of a series of 
intellectual puzzles scattered among large “areas of description”’. See also Bradney, above n 11, pp 2-17.  
21 P Birks ‘Introduction’ in Pressing Problems in the Law Volume 2: What are Law Schools For? (ed P Birks) 
(Oxford: OUP, 1996) p. ix. Peter Birks was latterly Professor of Civil Law at Oxford University and was a highly 
influential President of the Society of Legal Scholars.  For him, the close intellectual relationship with legal 
practice provided law with its special and (perhaps peculiar) character as an academic discipline.  He went on 
to argue that: ‘… legal research which criticises, explains, corrects legal doctrine is still and must remain the 
heart of the law school’s research. If our work is ever useless to judges and practising lawyers, we will have cut 
adrift from our foundations.’ See also Vick, above n 14, pp 177-181. 
22 See Birks ibid - it should be acknowledged that Birks also argued for a catholic approach to method and 
viewed the distinction between core and periphery as divisive and therefore unhelpful. 
23 As articulated in the Socio Legal Studies Association Ethics Statement (January 2009), above n 16. 
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academics, including those working in core subject areas, would 
probably view themselves as socio-legal scholars, albeit that 
doctrinal methods derived from legal practice are still key techniques 
in their research toolkits. The long-running conflict between 
doctrinal and socio-legal scholars, which was often heated,24 has now 
largely burnt out and there is mainstream acceptance that legal 
research encompasses liberal and pluralistic approaches to 
method.25  Thus, modern socio-legal studies can be said to be 
reforming and building on the doctrinal foundation of legal 
scholarship by integrating it into socio-legal research rather than 
discarding it,26 while much doctrinal analysis routinely integrates 
socio-legal and other perspectives.27 But, in any case, an important 
distinction can be made between research method and research 
subject matter.  In the context of the latter, Birks was surely right to 
identify adjudication by courts as being a fundamental concern of 
core UK legal scholarship.  And today, there is still a symbiotic (if not 
parasitic) relationship between a large proportion of legal 
scholarship at the centre of the legal space and the practice of law – 
even although much of the research is now broadly socio-legal in 
character, rather than solely doctrinal.28   
                                                          
24 Doctrinal research has been criticised by some socio-legal scholars for being old-fashioned, divorced from its 
social, economic, political, moral and theoretical contexts, intellectually narrow, and, in its least distinguished 
forms, descriptive ‘case law journalism’: see J Adams and R Brownsword Understanding Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell: London, 1991) p 30; and R van Gestel and H Micklitz ‘Revitalising Doctrinal Research: What About 
Methodology? (2004) European University Institute Working Papers Law 2011/05, p 2.  Socio-legal scholarship 
has, in its turn, been criticised by some as lacking firm academic and methodological foundations and for the 
uncritical and haphazard adoption of theories from other disciplines: see for example, Cownie, above n 4, pp 
68-69. 
25 McCrudden, above n 4, pp 642-646. 
26 For discussion, see Cownie, above n 4, pp 55-58; S Bartie ‘The lingering core of legal scholarship’ (2010) 30(3) 
LS 345, at pp 354-359; and M Keyes and R Johnstone ‘Review of legal academics: cultures and identities by 
Fiona Cownie’ (2005) Sydney LR 377 at 379.  M Siems ‘Legal Originality’ (2008) 28 OJLS 147 at pp 148-152; and 
Vick, above n 14, pp 165-166 also point to the continuing importance of doctrinal methods as part of what Vick 
called the ‘interdisciplinary spectrum’ in legal scholarship. 
27 McCrudden, above n 4, pp 644-645. 
28 Thus, the overview report of the UK Research Excellence Framework 2014 (‘REF 2014’) law sub-panel 
commented that it had reviewed a ‘large volume of outputs covering several core areas of law’, which included 
criminal law, criminal justice, public law and human rights, commercial law and EU law.  Tort law had ‘showed 




3. Locating UK environmental law scholarship: at the margins of 
the legal space 
Thinking about this wider legal space provides important insights 
into environmental law scholarship. Fisher et al have, of course, 
already argued that UK environmental law scholarship can be 
perceived as a marginal area of study on the grounds that it is a small 
specialism involving relatively few scholars, it appears disconnected 
from debates on methodology in mainstream legal scholarship, it has 
its roots in radical environmentalism, and it features infrequently in 
mainstream law journals.29  They point to the fact that 
environmental law is often taught to non-law students as well as 
those taking professionally accredited law degrees:30 it should be 
added that it is not one of the prescribed subjects for professional 
qualification as a lawyer in either England and Wales or Scotland.31  
And while there are environmental lawyers in practice, 
environmental law is, by comparison with large core subject sub-
spaces or specialisms such as tort, criminal law or commercial law, a 
small part of UK legal practice.  In itself, this pushes environmental 
law towards the margins of the legal space.  There is weight in all of 
these points, but it is argued that identifying key structural features 
inherent in environmental law scholarship which explain why it is 
marginal in relation to the core of the legal space raises more 
                                                          
a revival of scholarly interest’, although the volume of outputs submitted in property law and some ‘more 
traditional’ areas of mercantile law was ‘surprisingly low”.  The sub-panel also remarked on ‘a notable trend 
towards more broadly ‘contextual’ approaches to the discussion of legal issues’ and the increasing influence of 
socio-legal research methods and techniques. There were still, however, many ‘impressive examples of legal 
scholarship in the more traditional and classical modes’. See REF 2014: Overview report by Main Panel C and 
sub panels 16 to 26 (January 2015) p 71.  See also Vick, above n 14, pp 177 - 181. 
29 Fisher et al, above n 1, at 221-223. 
30 Ibid, p. 221. 
31 For information on the prescribed professional subjects, see above n 11. 
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(a) Analysing UK environmental law scholarship: the ‘classic/novel’ 
taxonomy 
What then might these structural features be? Providing a definition 
of environmental law itself is extremely difficult, for it is a vast, 
amorphous conglomeration of laws and regulatory systems that 
relate, directly and indirectly, to the environment.  Indeed, it has 
been said that it ‘encompasses, actually or potentially, everything 
that may ever be encompassed by law in general.’32  It is more 
straightforward, however, to identify the main approaches taken in 
environmental law scholarship, although it too is highly diverse.  This 
section therefore develops a taxonomy, which distinguishes between 
what is called ‘classic’ and ‘novel’ environmental law scholarship, and 
explores where these two categories are situated in the wider legal 
space.  
 
On first inspection, UK environmental law scholarship includes a 
wide range of subject matters and research methods.  Some scholars 
research practice-relevant areas such as remedies for environmental 
                                                          
32 A. Philoppopoulous- Mihalopoulos ‘Towards a Critical Environmental Law’ in A. Philoppopoulous- 
Mihalopoulos (ed) Law and Ecology: New Environmental Foundations (Routledge, 2011) p 18. 
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harm under tort,33 public nuisance,34 planning law35 waste law,36 or 
public law aspects of environmental law,37 where analysis of judicial 
decisions, statutory interpretation and the role of courts and 
tribunals is important.  Others focus on the supranational level,38 and 
in this context it should be acknowledged that the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice39 and a range of other international 
tribunals40 have made significant contributions to the development 
of environmental law.   
 
                                                          
33  See J Steele ‘Assessing the Past: Tort Law and Environmental Risk‘ in T Jewell and J Steele (eds) Law in 
Environmental Decision-Making (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), ch 4. 
34 See generally R Malcolm and J Ponting ‘Statutory Nuisance: the Sanitary Paradigm and Judicial Conservatism’ 
(2006) 18 JEL 37; M Lee ‘Personal Injury, Public Nuisance and Environmental Regulation’ (2009) 20 King’s Law 
Journal 129; and N Papworth ‘Public Nuisance in the Environmental Context’ [2008] JPL 1526.  
35 See for example R Duxbury Telling and Duxbury’s Planning Law and Procedure (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
36 For discussion of the legal definitions of waste, see D Wilkinson ‘Time to Discard the Concept of Waste?’ 
(1999) 1 Env LR 172; S Tromans ‘EC Waste Law – A Complete Mess?’ (2001) 13 JEL 133; I Cheyne ‘The 
Definition of Waste in EC Law’ (2002) 14 JEL 61; and R Lee and E Stokes ‘Rehabilitating the Definition of Waste: 
Is it Fully Recovered?’ (2008) YEEL 162. 
37 Which involves discussion of a range of issues: for example, legal provision for public participation in 
decision-taking and access to justice in environmental matters under the Aarhus Convention, EU law and 
domestic legislation; regulation, governance and enforcement; judicial review of administrative action; and 
human rights aspects of environmental law. On which generally and respectively, see M Lee and C Abbot ‘The 
Usual Suspects? Public Participation Under the Aarhus Convention’ (2003) 66 MLR 80; J Steele ‘Participation 
and Deliberation in Environmental Law: A Problem Solving Approach’ (2001) 21 OJLS 415; N Gunningham 
‘Environmental Law, regulation and governance: shifting architectures’ (2009) 21 JEL 179; R Macrory 
Regulation, Enforcement and Governance in Environmental Law, (Oxford and Portland: Hart, 2010); R Macrory 
Consistency and Effectiveness: Strengthening the New Environmental Tribunal (London: UCL Centre for Law 
and the Environment, 2011); R Moules Environmental Judicial Review (Oxford: Hart, 2011); and K. Morrow 
‘Worth the Paper they are Written On? Human Rights and the Environment in the Law of England and Wales’ 
(2010) 1 JHRE 66. 
38 I.e. EU and international law, both of which could be considered topics in their own right. On the former, see 
generally L Kramer EU Environmental Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) and ‘Thirty Years of EC Environmental 
Law: Perspectives and Prospectives’ (2002) YEEL 155; I von Homeyer ‘The Evolution of EU Environmental 
Governance’ in J Scott (ed) Environmental Protection: European Law and Governance (Oxford: OUP, 2009); and 
H Vedder, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and European Environmental Law and Policy’ (2010) 22 JEL 285. On the latter, 
see generally P Birnie, A Boyle and C Redgwell International Law and the Environment (Oxford: OUP, 2009); D 
Bodansky The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2010); and P 
Sands and J Peel Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2012).  
39 See for example, F Jacobs ‘The Role of the ECJ in the Protection of the Environment’ (2006) 8 JEL 185; and 
Tromans and Cheyne, above n 36. 
40 E.g. the International Court of Justice, the World Trade Organisation dispute settlement mechanism, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the European Court of Human Rights. For an excellent 
analysis of this complex area, see generally T Stephens International Courts and Environmental Protection 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
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Much modern UK environmental law is, of course, cast in statute by 
either the UK Parliament or the devolved legislatures after 
promulgation in EU directives.41  And while, as inferred above, courts 
and tribunals have a significant role in determining disputes and in 
the development of the law in areas such as planning,42 statutory 
nuisance,43 waste law44 and water pollution offences,45 in other 
areas, such as integrated pollution control regulation,46 air quality,47 
climate change48 and genetically modified organisms,49 they are 
often excluded from adjudicating on substantive merits and are 
largely restricted to judicial review of administrative action and 
enforcement.50  A number of scholars therefore specialise in rapidly 
developing statute and regulation based fields which have relatively 
few justiciable issues and limited interaction with courts, judges and 
lawyers: as is expanded on below, those working in these areas often 
explore different aspects of environmental governance.   
 
                                                          
41 For discussion of the significance of the EU law dimension in UK environmental law, see D Wyatt ‘Litigating 
Community Environmental Law – Thoughts on the Direct Effect Doctrine’ (1998) 10 JEL 9 at p 10. 
42 See Duxbury, above n 35, chs 19-20. 
43 See Malcolm and Ponting, Lee, and Papworth, above n 34. 
44 See Wilkinson, Tromans and Cheyne, above n 36. 
45 See for discussion, E Fisher, B Lange and E Scotford Environmental Law (Oxford: OUP, 2013) pp 583-597; and 
D Wilkinson ‘Causing and Knowingly Permitting Pollution Offences: A Review’ (1993) 4/1 Water Law 25.   
46 For comprehensive general discussion, see S Bell, D McGillivray and OW Pederson Environmental Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2013) ch 14. 
47 Fisher, Lange and Scotford, above n 45, p 614. 
48 While some have contended that courts can have a potentially significant role in the development of climate 
change law, Fisher, Lange and Scotford argue that ‘[w]hatever the merits of this scholarly debate, climate 
change litigation has been limited and fragmented’: ibid, p 639.  For a discussion of developments in a range of 
jurisdictions, see R Lord, S Goldberg, L Rajamani, J Brunee Climate Change Liability: Transnational Law and 
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
49 Although the EU legislation on GMOs has given rise to some European litigation concerning the distribution 
of power between the EU and member states and the interpretation of EU law (see principally Case C-304/02 
European Commission v France; Joined Cases C-439/05 and C-454/05 P, Land Oberosterreich and Another v 
Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECT I -7141; and Case C-165/08 Commission of the European 
Communities v Republic of Poland [2009] ECR I-6843), its function is making procedural and institutional 
provision for the controlled release of GMOs by the EU and member states (see G Little ‘The Regulation of 
Genetically Modified Organisms as an Environmental Risk’ in F McManus (ed) Environmental Law  (Edinburgh: 
W. Green, 2007) ch 7). The role of domestic courts under the statutory regime is therefore limited. 
50 See above notes 46-49 for examples. 
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In this context, Macrory's elaboration of Burke’s distinction between 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ environmental agendas offers a valuable 
perspective on a key structural distinction within environmental law 
scholarship,51 which facilitates understanding of its relationship with 
the wider legal space.   
 
The old agenda is concerned with areas such water pollution, or the 
disposal of waste.  Here, the environmental issues and problems are 
well understood, the science is relatively established and there is a 
consensus on the part of policymakers, the public and industry that 
regulation is appropriate: as Macrory puts it, ‘the basic legal toolkit is 
not called into question’.52  Core legal concepts, such as the rights of 
the person, property rights, liability, compensation, criminal 
responsibility, vires and access to justice have clear utility and 
significance. Indeed, the courts have been applying them in 
environmental areas such as pollution control and nuisance since the 
early nineteenth century.53 
 
By contrast, the new environmental agenda involves analysis of the 
governance of contested meta-level issues such as sustainable 
development, climate change and biodiversity.  Here, scientific 
understanding might be incomplete or disputed and the policy 
solutions may be far more diverse and controversial than in old 
agenda areas:54 as is expanded on below, legal research in these new 
areas is inherently more problematical.  Indeed, Macrory suggests 
                                                          
51 Macrory, above n 1, p 254; and R Macrory Regulation, Enforcement and Governance in Environmental Law 
(Oxford: Hart, 2014) p 245. 
52 Macrory (2014) ibid. 
53 S Coyle and K Morrow The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law (Oxford and Portland: Hart, 
2004) pp 108-9. 
54 Macrory (2014), above n 51, p 245. 
Page 15 of 48 
 
that it is ‘by no means clear what sort of legal techniques are 
appropriate, or indeed what role law really has in their resolution.’55  
 
(i) Classic environmental law scholarship 
Legal research which is concerned with the old environmental 
agenda can be characterised as ‘classic’ environmental law 
scholarship: broadly speaking, it is a small field of scholarship which 
gives the analysis of legal principle and the activities of courts a 
similar profile to that which exists in larger, more mainstream 
subject areas, and its focus and nature is comparable to other 
subjects at or near the core of the legal space.  Classic environmental 
law scholarship is therefore not a chronological definition and it 
encompasses the use of a range of research methods. It is not 
described as classic because it adheres to traditional doctrinal 
methods but because it has intellectual contiguity with the research 
activity at the core of the legal space - much of which is now, as 
discussed earlier, broadly socio-legal in approach. 
 
Thus, for example, property rights are viewed by some as being an 
obstacle to environmental protection,56 while others argue that they 
have the potential to strengthen it.57  There is considerable 
scholarship analysing the impact of the principles of tort law on 
environmental law,58 and private and public nuisance (the latter 
                                                          
55 Macrory, above n 1, p 254: see also ibid. 
56 See Coyle and Morrow, above n 37, p 157. For a critical analysis of the anthropocentric nature of traditional 
approaches to property law, see Graham, above n 1. 
57 C Rodgers ‘Nature's Place?  Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental Stewardship’ (2009) 68 CLJ 
550 at pp 557-558.  Concepts of property rights are also closely intertwined with the environmental idea of the 
‘commons’: for discussion, see C Rodgers, ‘Reversing the “Tragedy” of the Commons?  Sustainable 
Management and the Commons Act 2006’ (2010) 73 MLR 461 and pp 463-464.   
58 See Steele, above n 33.  
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being both a crime and in certain contexts a tort) have obvious 
relevance in the environmental context.59  Judicial review of 
administrative action is also important in environmental law given its 
statutory basis and the role of state regulators in environmental 
governance.60 
 
Inevitably, therefore, classic environmental law scholarship is often 
derivative of more established core scholarship.  This is not to argue 
that it does not augment and develop core scholarship or deepen 
understanding of environmental law in important ways: much classic 
environmental law scholarship is of a very high standard.  
Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that the main legal 
principles in play are often not originally or intrinsically 
‘environmental’ in nature, but are derived from other core subjects.  
Thus, for example, Cane has queried whether environmental cases 
involving tort are primarily about environmental issues rather than 
tort.61  Similarly, Lee makes the point that public and private 
nuisance have never been ‘about’ environmental law,62 and the same 
could be said of judicial review of the decisions of environmental 
regulators.  For this key structural reason, classic environmental law 
scholarship may therefore be viewed as being marginal in relation to 
the core of the legal space, as it lacks clear intellectual 
distinctiveness: what gives it an identity as a specialism is its subject 
matter, rather than the legal principles which are at issue. 
 
(ii) Novel environmental law scholarship 
                                                          
59 See Lee, and Papworth, above n 34.   
60 See Moules, above n 37. 
61 P. Cane, ‘Are Environmental Harms Special?’  (2001) 13 JEL 3. 
62 Lee, above n 34, p 136. 
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As Macrory suggests, legal research into new agenda issues - or what 
is called ‘novel’ environmental law scholarship - presents different, 
more fundamental challenges. Why is this? A key reason is surely 
that it has relatively little connection with core legal principles or 
with courts and adjudication. While issues such as the governance 
and regulation of climate change raise huge social, political and 
moral controversies and give rise to treaty agreements and EU and 
domestic legislation, they are, in the UK context at least, for the most 
part neither addressed through the prism of individuated legal rights 
and nor are they readily justiciable: they are, to use Fuller’s term, 
strongly polycentric.63  As a result, in relation to much novel UK 
environmental law scholarship, specialised legal knowledge and 
principles – the evaluation of which is the core activity in the legal 
space – has uncertain relevance in the analysis of the law’s content 
or its underlying objectives.64 Instead, legal scholars must develop 
ideas on how to interact with public policy and sometimes 
competing non-legal economic and social science concepts and 
methods.65  This relative lack of connection with the world of legal 
principle, courts, judges and lawyers is the key difference between 
novel UK environmental law scholarship and the core of the legal 
space. 
 
In making this point, it is acknowledged that there are similarities 
between novel environmental law scholarship and research into 
subject areas at the core of legal space which also have a high 
statutory and regulatory content, such as company law.  For 
                                                          
63 See Fisher, Lange and Scotford, above n 45. For definition of polycentricity, see L Fuller ‘The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard LR 353 at p 395. Fuller argued that the more polycentric a situation 
becomes, the less amenable it is to adjudication: see pp 394-404. 
64 The difficulties this poses for environmental law scholars are discussed by Fisher et al: see above n1 pp 235-
239.  
65 Ibid. 
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example, the substantive law is often comprised of complex blends 
of EU legislation, domestic statutes and administrative rules.  
Research can involve analysis of a mix of criminal, civil and 
governance/regulatory/policy issues. Nonetheless, there is still a 
basic distinction to be made in terms of the subject matter.  UK 
legislation on a new environmental agenda issue such as climate 
change, which has its origin in international agreements and EU 
policy, is the consequence of complex, multi-layered decisions made 
by policy-makers, scientific and technical advisers, stakeholders and 
regulators.66  It is the functional by-product of these decisions and, at 
the risk of generalisation, its purpose is the implementation of policy 
based on scientific advice, the balancing of key stakeholders’ 
interests, and the utilisation of the most effective regulatory 
technique.67  Traditional legal relationships, principles and issues are 
generally not the ‘main event’ in legislation of this sort, as they often 
are in areas such as company law,68 other than in relation to matters 
such as enforcement where the legal system has traditionally had a 
role.69 In relative terms, specialised legal knowledge and 
understanding therefore has limited relevance in terms of the 
content of legislation: much of what the law deals with amounts to 
what might be called ‘non-legal’ regulation in that it lacks any 
significant foundation in or connection with legal principle.  In 
                                                          
66 For a discussion of the conventional UK approach to balancing policy, scientific evidence and industry 
interests in environmental law, see Bell, McGillivray and Pederson, above n 46, pp. 232-234. For a flavour of 
the complexities involved in this process, see R Macrory, ‘Loaded Guns and Monkeys – Responsible 
Environmental Law’ in R Macrory (ed) Regulation, Enforcement and Governance in Environmental Law (Oxford 
and Portland: Hart, 2010) 367 at pp 376 – 384; and The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 21st 
Report Setting Environmental Standards (1998) CM 4053, chs 1 and 8.  
67 Bell, McGillivray and Pederson, above n 46 ibid, pp 232 – 266. 
68 For example, one of the main reforms introduced by the Companies Act 2006 – the largest statute passed by 
the UK Parliament - was the creation of a new statutory statement of company directors’ duties, many of 
which were originally fiduciary duties created under the common law. 
69 See Macrory (2010), above note 66. Professor Macrory’s work on regulatory sanctions has had a significant 
effect on the environmental enforcement regime in England (and other areas of regulation) via the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2010. There is a strong and influential tradition of legal scholarship on 
environmental enforcement: see for example K Hawkins Enforcement and environment; regulation and the 
social definition of pollution (Oxford: OUP, 1984). 
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addition, and while there may be scope for judicial review of 
administrative action in some contexts, and the use of legal skills 
such as statutory interpretation and drafting, climate change 
legislation does not provide a significant role for court-based 
adjudication in dispute resolution.70 By contrast, in areas such as 
company law, as in old agenda or classic environmental law, the 
courts are the most authoritative forum for resolving disputes. 
 
Novel environmental law therefore presents existential challenges 
for legal scholars.  As a result, they have tended to focus on the 
structures and processes of governance, and a significant body of 
outstanding work has been done in analysing governance regimes, 
the design of regulatory models, instruments, the processes of 
standard setting, the linkages between policy and legal provision and 
enforcement in the environmental context.71  It is, however, often 
difficult for this kind of scholarship to connect its analyses with the 
intellectual excitement of meta-level debates about the 
environment. Studies of governance and regulatory structures can 
seem abstract or technical and far removed from the dramatic 
challenges posed by environmental change.  For while scholarship in 
environmental sciences, policy studies and economics can address 
big issues such as the causes of climate change and how society can 
and should react, legal research necessarily tends to focus narrowly 
on detailed, follow-up analyses of the legal/regulatory structures and 
processes which have been put in place to implement society’s 
response.  Although this is important in the context of developing 
                                                          
70 See Fisher, Lange and Scotford, above n 45. 
71 See for example, Gunningham, above n 37; N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); D Driesen ‘Alternatives to regulation? Market 
mechanisms and the environment’ in M Cave, R Baldwin and M Lodge (eds) Oxford Handbook on Regulation 
(Oxford: Oxford University press, 2009), ch 10; The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, above n 66; 
and Macrory (2010), above note 66. 
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understanding of environmental law, it is intrinsically secondary to 
the main debate, and does not have the same wide resonance. 
 
Moreover, while acknowledging fully the often high quality of 
environmental governance studies and that scholars in the field have 
a wide range of different interests and intellectual starting points, it 
is possible to view many of them as part of, and therefore broadly 
derivative of, a wider, diffuse body of scholarship on governance and 
regulation, as developed in the UK context by Ogus, Baldwin, Black 
and others.72  Notwithstanding the valuable contribution that 
environmental law scholars make to the development of governance 
and regulatory concepts,73 much discourse on environmental 
governance can be seen as drawing on key themes in the broad 
church of governance scholarship, such as economic74 and policy75 
justifications for regulation, social theories76 and concepts of 
regulatory space and design.77 This is not to denigrate the work of 
scholars who are developing diverse strands of law and policy studies 
and governance/regulatory analysis in the environmental context – 
much of it is excellent – but it is surely the case that different ideas 
on governance are its main theoretical drivers, rather than 
specifically environmental concepts.  It might also be observed that 
                                                          
72 See generally A Ogus Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart Publishing 2004); R Baldwin, M 
Cave and M Lodge Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2011); R Baldwin, 
M Cave and M Lodge (eds)  The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 2010); JM Black ‘‘Which Arrow?’ 
Regulatory Policy and Rule Type' [1995] Public Law 94; R Baldwin and J Black ‘Really responsive regulation’ 
(2008) 71(1) MLR, 59-94; and R Baldwin and J Black ‘Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation’ (2010) 32 Law 
and Policy 181. 
73 Fisher et al, above n 1, p 233. 
74 See Ogus, above n 72, ch 3. 
75 See C Hilson Regulating Pollution: A UK and EU Perspective (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2000) pp. 
3-5. 
76 E.g. risk theories: for a (still) relevant discussion of how risk theories and the perception and communication 
of risk impact on regulation, see S Krimsky and D Golding (eds) Social Theories of Risk (Westport and London: 
Praeger, 1992). 
77 See Hancher and Moran, and Scott, above n 9. 
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the wider body of scholarship on governance is itself at the boundary 
of where public law theory shades into public administration:78 this 
reiterates the marginal status of much novel environmental law 
scholarship in relation to the core activity of the legal space, 
notwithstanding that some of it may have significance for policy 
makers.79 
 
(b) Where does environmental law scholarship go from here? 
At a more profound level, it is argued that these structural factors 
raise fundamental questions about the future direction of 
intellectual travel for environmental law scholarship as a whole.  For 
while classic environmental law scholarship can exist in the legal 
space, it is, as things stand, likely to continue as a small, specialised 
and derivative specialism – a scholarly offshoot of the main tree. 
Novel environmental law scholarship’s relative lack of connection 
with the world of legal principle, judges and the courts means that it 
is also located at the outer borders of the legal space.  For this 
reason, it is likely to remain of limited significance to core legal 
scholarship.  
 
These arguments have, it is argued, significant implications for the 
future of environmental law scholarship and should be 
acknowledged before it can mature. For this author at least, they 
lead to the conclusion that if it is to develop, scholars must take a 
determined step outside the legal space and develop harder, more 
meaningful academic and intellectual connections with those 
                                                          
78 Fisher et al, above n 1, pp 235 - 239. See also J Scott and D Trubek ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches 
to Governance in the European Union’ (2002) 8 Eur LJ 1. 
79 E.g., the work of Neil Gunningham. 
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working in other environmental disciplines.  By contrast, Pederson 
has argued recently that the potential of interdisciplinary working is 
often exaggerated, and that environmental law scholarship is best 
thought of as a ‘deliberative practice, which speaks to, and takes 
place within’ an ‘interpretative community of scholars’.80 For him, 
the focus of activity should be on attempts to persuade the 
community from within, while the community itself should be 
flexible, open and broad in its approach to scholarship.81   
 
It is argued here, however, that – notwithstanding the difficulties 
inherent in it – working across disciplinary boundaries has a number 
of important potential benefits.  For classic environmental law 
scholarship, it provides the opportunity to develop distinctive and 
innovative approaches to method which could not only benefit the 
specialism and other disciplines, but which could also be of interest 
and value to scholars elsewhere in the legal academy. And for novel 
legal scholarship, which has a weak intellectual relationship with the 
core of legal space and orbits in relative obscurity at the edge of its 
gravitational pull, exploring how research on environmental 
governance and regulation can relate to environmental science in 
particular offers the exciting prospect of more direct engagement 
with the big themes and issues in environmental debate, rather than 
focusing inwardly on the technical analysis of governance: for science 
has long been the core activity in what might be called the wider 
environmental space.82 
                                                          
80 Pederson (2014), above n 1, p 424. 
81 Ibid and pp 435 – 440. 
82 McEldowney and McEldowney, above n 1, 171. Science should not, however, be assumed to be a monolithic 
entity. There are differences of emphasis and approach in different scientific disciplines and within the 
environmental sciences, which are comprised of a range of disciplines: for discussion of the development of 
the environmental sciences, see PJ Bowler The Fontana History of Environmental Sciences (London: Fontana, 
1992).  
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4. Looking beyond the legal space: towards interdisciplinarity 
To argue that environmental law scholarship must involve 
interdisciplinarity is, of course, not new.  Heinzerling, for example, 
has argued that it is ‘pervasively interdisciplinary’ and that for 
scholars working in the field ‘interdisciplinarity is not a trend: it’s a 
way of life.’83  It is, however, important to understand what is meant 
by interdisciplinarity.  A commonly accepted definition is that it is a 
way of doing research which integrates among other things 
techniques, perspectives, concepts and/or theories from more than 
one discipline to develop knowledge in a way that would be beyond 
the capacity of a single discipline.84 Research of this sort which takes 
place between cognate disciplines such as law and policy is 
sometimes termed ‘moderate’ interdisciplinarity, while that which 
involves working across major disciplinary divides such as law and 
science can be called ‘radical’ interdisciplinarity.85 In addition, 
interdisciplinary research is often distinguished from 
multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary research.  The former draws 
from a number of disciplines without breaking down the boundaries 
between them: that is, it provides separate disciplinary perspectives 
on the issue under consideration.86  The latter seeks to develop novel 
approaches and forms of discourse that transcend traditional 
                                                          
83 L Heinzerling ‘The Environment’, in P Cane and MV Tushnet (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies 
(Oxford: OUP, 2003) 701 at p 703. 
84 National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine 
Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2004), p 2. See also JT Klein 
Crossing Boundaries: Knowledge, Disciplinarities and Interdiciplinarities (University Press of Virginia, 1996). For 
a thoughtful analysis of interdisciplinarity in the legal context, see Vick, above n 14, at pp 181-191: he also 
highlighted the importance of defining what is meant by it - see pp 164-165. 
85 European Science Foundation and European Cooperation in Science and Technology Responses to 
Environmental and Societal Challenges for our Unstable Earth (RESCUE) (2012) p 48, available at: 
http://www.esf.org/fileadmin/Public_documents/Publications/rescue.pdf 
86 ibid. 
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disciplinary boundaries.87  In this context, what form does 
interdisciplinarity take in UK environmental law scholarship? 
 
Given the complexity of environmental issues and the law that 
relates to and interacts with them, both classic and novel 
environmental law scholars must have a good understanding of 
other disciplines, particularly key aspects of science, and be able to 
integrate them into their work.  Novel scholarship also requires 
expertise in policy and governance, which includes developing an 
understanding of economics and social science.88   
 
Many modern UK environmental law scholars – whether classic or 
novel – therefore take a range of socio-legal approaches, which by 
their very nature encourage the use of insights derived from other 
disciplines to varying degrees: as touched on above, the SLSA defines 
socio-legal research as embracing disciplines and subjects concerned 
with the law, the social effects of law and legal systems, the 
influences of social, political and economic factors on them, and a 
wide range of research methods.89   
 
By way of illustration, and while Fisher et al have  noted that there is 
often an ‘unspoken presumption’90 to the effect that UK 
environmental law scholarship is somehow disconnected, or at least 
semi-detached, from methodological debate in mainstream legal 
                                                          
87 JT Klein, ‘Evaluation of Interdisciplinary and Transdisciplinary Research’ (2008) Am J Prev Med 35 (2s), s 117.  
Note that within the sciences, the definition can vary: see for example European Science Foundation and 
European Cooperation in Science and Technology, above n 85. 
88 Fisher et al, above n 1, pp 232-233. 
89  See the criteria of the UK Socio-Legal Studies Association, above n 16. 
90 Fisher et al, above n1, 246-247. They argue that the presumption is false. 
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scholarship, the methods used by most environmental law scholars 
writing in the leading and most established specialist UK 
environmental law journal would seem to fall squarely into the 
SLSA’s broad socio-legal category. Analysis of the sixty-five full 
articles91 published in the Journal of Environmental Law (‘the JEL’) in 
the years 2009-2013 indicates that sixty could be defined as socio-
legal92 and only five could be described as being predominantly 
doctrinal.93 It is, of course, acknowledged that analysis of one journal 
should be seen in proper context.94  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to 
characterise the showcase UK journal for environmental law 
scholarship, and therefore the intellectual direction of the specialism 
itself, as being broadly socio-legal in character and, at least in 
relation to method, part of the mainstream of UK legal scholarship. 
 
Closer scrutiny of the JEL’s recent contents also provides further 
pointers as to the nature and extent of interdisciplinarity in UK 
environmental law scholarship.  A significant proportion of the socio-
legal articles published by it involve, to a greater or lesser extent 
depending on the approach of individual scholars, 
conventional/doctrinal analysis of substantive law inter-woven with 
policy, governance, regulatory, theoretical or comparative issues, or 
what might be called ‘law in context’ scholarship: this would seem to 
reflect a broader trend in UK legal research.95  Of the sixty broadly 
                                                          
91 Two papers appearing in the articles section in 2009 were not included in the sample as full articles as they 
were short correspondence responses following on from an earlier paper. 
92 I.e. using the criteria of the UK Socio-Legal Studies Association, above n 16. 
93 I.e. they were predominantly or entirely composed of doctrinal analysis of legal provision. 
94 Note that Fisher et al analysed the number of environmental law articles published in the period 2000-2007 
in generalist law journals, and found that there were relatively few (i.e. 36) by comparison with four other 
applied legal subjects.  There were, however, proportionately more environmental law articles published in 
specialist European and international law journals than these other applied subjects (i.e. 88) during the sample 
period.  See Fisher at al, above n 1, pp 222-223. 
95 See REF 2014: Overview report by Main Panel C and sub panels 16 to 26, above n 28, p 72. What Fisher et al 
and Pederson refer to as ‘interactional expertise’, in which environmental law scholars utilise knowledge from 
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socio-legal articles published in the sample, thirty-eight can be 
classified as law in context studies, while eighteen articles can be 
said to be concerned predominantly with governance, regulatory, 
historical, policy or theoretically based discussions.  The remaining 
four focussed on research methods.   
 
It is, however, interesting to note that only four articles can be 
identified clearly96as involving actual collaboration between legal 
scholars and colleagues from different disciplines.97 In general terms 
therefore, the preponderance of research published in the JEL over 
the five year sample period can be characterised as ‘solo’ socio-
legal/law in context scholarship, or ‘moderate’ interdisciplinarity, 
embodying the dominant tradition of the lone scholar in legal 
research.  In addition, only one of the published articles in the 
sample frame made significant use of empirically derived data.  This 
is unsurprising, as most scholars in the legal space generally have 
graduated from university law schools and have not been formally 
trained in research methods other than doctrinal techniques derived 
from legal practice.   
 
In this context, developing a stronger, more ‘radical’ 
interdisciplinarity which involves working with those in non-cognate 
disciplines such as the environmental sciences is challenging. It 
                                                          
other disciplines without seeking to contribute to those disciplines, can be seen as a feature of law in context 
scholarship: see Fisher et al, above n 1, p 232; and Pederson (2014), above n 1, 427. 
96 There were forty-seven sole authored pieces in the overall sample, forty-two of which can be identified as 
having been written by legal scholars: of this last category, thirty-nine were socio-legal in nature. Note that it 
was not always possible to identify with certainty the disciplinary background of authors from the information 
provided in the journal and internet searches. If it was not possible to do so, their outputs were not included: 
the findings should be interpreted accordingly. 
97 There were eighteen co-authored articles in total and four that can be identified as having been written 
entirely by non-lawyers (as individuals or jointly with other non-lawyers). See ibid for the context to the 
findings. 
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involves a significant amount of reading, thinking, meeting new 
colleagues and a heavy investment of time.98  And, at a fundamental 
level, those in other environmental spaces or disciplines must want 
to be associated with environmental law scholarship.  There must be 
a clear benefit for all in order that meaningful collaboration can take 
place.  Otherwise, it is mere good intention, which is unlikely to lead 
to anything which is academically significant.   
 
Environmental law research has, of course, established a wider 
relevance in some areas, particularly in relation to enforcement.99  
That said, it is difficult to devise new ways of getting beyond the safe 
laagers of small communities of legal scholars in conversation with 
each other. And there is an obvious problem for those wanting to 
break out into new areas and connect with other disciplinary spaces.  
Most will, as legal academics, wish (and indeed need) to continue to 
use the legal research methods and internal language utilised by 
scholars closer to the core of the legal space: they lack the 
background and training to do otherwise.  It must therefore be asked 
how, without re-inventing the methodological wheel, existing legal 
research techniques can become more relevant to those in 
neighbouring disciplinary spaces and by so doing make a significant 
contribution to wider environmental discourse.100 This is a positive 
challenge rather than an intellectual crisis. It has the potential to 
encourage the development of new contexts in which legal analysis 
can be utilised.  By doing so, classic and novel environmental law 
                                                          
98 For a detailed discussion, see the National Academies, above n 84, chs 4-6.  
99 For the leading example, see Macrory (2010), above n 66. 
100 A number of scholars have considered this issue. For example, Samuel argues that law is an intellectually 
closed off ‘authority paradigm’ as opposed to an ‘enquiry paradigm’ and as such has little to offer scientists or 
social scientists: see G Samuel ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken Seriously 
by Scientists and Social Scientists?’ (2009) 36 JLS 431. 
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scholarship can not only develop but can also explore fresh 
perspectives for the legal academy generally. 
 
(5) New perspectives for environmental law scholarship: learning 
from the environmental humanities and sciences 
So how is environmental law scholarship to engage with other 
disciplines?  There are, naturally, a number of different courses which 
can be set and it would be unwise to be prescriptive.  This article, 
however, focuses on what can be learnt from emerging ideas in other 
environmental subject areas which are also grappling with the 
challenges of how to make new intellectual connections beyond 
disciplinary boundaries.   
 
Lacking a background in social science research methods, many legal 
scholars may feel a closer intellectual contiguity with the 
environmental humanities101 than with social science, and the 
environmental humanities are also attempting to address the issue of 
how to utilise their core methods in new, interdisciplinary contexts. 
 
The emerging field of environmental humanities is more than a 
growing corpus of work within a number of different disciplines: 
rather, it is an attempt to bring ‘various approaches to environmental 
scholarship into conversation with each other in numerous and 
diverse ways’.102  Among other things, environmental humanities seek 
                                                          
101 I.e. disciplines such as environmental history, philosophy and literature. 
102 DB Rose, T van Dooren, M Chrulew, S Cooke, M Kearnes and E O’Gorman ‘Thinking Through the 
Environment, Unsettling the Humanities’ (2012) 1 Environmental Humanities, 1 at pp 1-2, available at: 
http://environmentalhumanities.org/arch/vol1/EH1.1.pdf.  See also S Sӧrlin, ‘Reconfiguring Environmental 
expertise’ (2013) 28 Environmental Science and Policy 14; S Sӧrlin, ‘Environmental humanities: why should 
biologists interested in the environment take humanities seriously? (2012) 62(9) BioScience 788; T Griffith, 
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to add value to high-level environmental debate by facilitating 
understanding of the philosophical and cultural modes of thinking by 
which humans and their different cultures and societies ‘have made 
themselves at home in a more than human world’.103  Law is clearly 
part of this meta–dynamic: for example, its substantive content and 
the approach of lawmakers and regulators can be seen as embodying 
and expressing the anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism 
which has dominated Western society for millennia.  That said, as 
argued earlier, and notwithstanding the attempts made by a number 
of environmental law scholars to establish interdisciplinary links with 
the sciences,104 it has in the past proved difficult for legal scholarship 
to make a distinctive impact on high-level interdisciplinary debate.   
 
Environmental science is also in the process of reaching out to the 
humanities and social sciences.  The 2012 ‘Responses to 
Environmental and Societal Challenges for our Unstable Earth’ 
(‘RESCUE’) report produced by the European Science Foundation and 
European Cooperation in Science and Technology argued strongly that 
the emergence of the concept of the ‘Anthopocene’ as a new epoch 
in the Earth’s history, in which human activity affects the rate of and 
ways in which the global environment changes, ‘poses fundamentally 
new challenges and requires innovative ways of thinking and 
acting.’105  Understanding therefore needs to be reframed, in order 
that environmental change is re-conceptualised as a social and human 
phenomenon, rather than solely as a matter of environmental 
                                                          
‘The Humanities and an Environmentally Sustainable Australia’ (2007) 43 Australia Humanities Review at  
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-December-2007/EcoHumanities/EcoGriffiths.html 
(The paper was also published in The Humanities and Australia's National Research Priorities, (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2003) 13); and DK Swearer ‘Introduction’ in DK Swearer (ed) Ecology and the Environment: 
Perspectives from the Humanities (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008) pp 9 – 20. 
103 Rose et al, ibid, p 2.  
104 E.g., McEldowney and McEldowney, above n 1. 
105 European Science Foundation and European Cooperation in Science and Technology, above n 85, p 3.   
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science.106 This again emphasises the development of new ways of 
interdisciplinary working and requires the humanities and social 
sciences to ‘step up’107 to the complex, long-term challenges involved 
in making a meaningful contribution to this new, wider debate.108 
 
It is vital that UK environmental lawyers play their part in this 
intellectual paradigm shift.109  As already argued, doing so may have 
significant benefits for both classic and novel research. More broadly, 
it would enable UK environmental law scholarship to contribute to 
interdisciplinary efforts to address major, existential environmental 
challenges such as climate change: only legal scholars can realise law’s 
potential to facilitate understanding of how society can and should 
address environmental problems.  In this context, therefore, what can 
environmental law scholarship learn from ongoing interdisciplinary 
developments in the humanities and sciences in order to make a 
valuable contribution?  
  
 
(a) Perspectives from the environmental humanities 
                                                          
106 Ibid, p 5 and pp 12-13. See also G Palsson, B Szerszynski, S Sӧrlin, J Marks, B Avril, C Crumley, H Hackmann, 
P Holm, J Ingram, A Kirman, MP Buendίa, R Weehuizen ‘Reconceptualising the ‘Anthropos’ in the 
Anthropocene: Integrating the social sciences and humanities in global environmental change research’ (2013) 
28 Environmental Science and Policy 3; P Holm, ME Goodsite, S Cloetingh, M Agnoletti, B Moldan, DJ Lang, R 
Leemans, JO Muoller, MP Buendίa, W Pohl, RW Scholz, A Sors, B Vanheusden, K Yusoff, R Zondervan 
‘Collaboration between the natural, social and human sciences in Global Change Research’   (2013) 28 
Environmental Science and Policy 25; Sӧrlin (2013), above n 93; JG Speth The Bridge at the End of the World: 
Capitalism, the Environment and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 
2008); and P Ehrlich and D Kennedy ‘Millennium Assessment of Human Behavior’ (July 22 2005) Science 562. 
107 Palsson et al, ibid, p 4. 
108 Sӧrlin (2013), above n 102, p 22. 
109 Indeed, in addition to Sӧrlin, ibid, Holm et al, above n 106, p 26, cite law as one of the important disciplines 
which can help ‘to fully understand Earth systems and human motivation and to guide decision-makers.’ 
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Increasingly, scholars are arguing110 that the humanities should 
embrace the growing understanding on both sides of the 
sciences/humanities divide that the complexity of science and the 
natural world cannot be separated from human perceptions of it: 
perceptions and knowledge must be interpreted and judged, and this 
provides humanities scholars with the opportunity to utilise their 
distinctive insights and methods in a new interdisciplinary context.  
Three key approaches in humanities research111 offer particularly 
valuable perspectives for environmental law scholars.  
 
First, environmental scientists often think in terms of very long 
timescales.  Their focus is on interactions between species, the cycles 
of nature and other environmental phenomena which provide 
evidence of pollution and climate change: the consequences of 
problems such as radioactive waste or greenhouse gas emission may 
play out over hundreds to millions of years.112  By contrast, the 
humanities specialise in analysing time spans of centuries or human 
lifetimes and can therefore set human activity in the context of 
environmental change. By doing so, they can bridge the intellectual 
gap between environmental and human timescales and deepen 
understanding of society’s complex interrelationship with 
environmental problems.113     
 
                                                          
110   See for example Rose, van Dooren, Chrulew, Cooke, Kearnes and O’Gorman; Sӧrlin; Griffiths; and Swearer, 
all above at n 102. 
111 For discussion, see Griffiths, above n 102, pp 3-5.  
112 See Griffiths, above n 102, p 4; and ML McInney, RM Schioch, L Yonavjak, Environmental Science: Systems 
and Solutions (Burlington MA: Jones and Bartlett; 2013) p 579. 
113 For a thought-provoking discussions, see JR McNeill, Something New Under the Sun (New York: WW Norton 
and Company, 2000), chapter 1; and Griffiths ibid.  For wide-ranging analysis of the interconnection of 
environmental and human timescales, see N Roberts, The Holocene: An Environmental History (Oxford: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2014).   
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Environmental historians, for example, often have human interaction 
with the physical environment, or an aspect of it such as a particular 
landscape, as their focal point for framing research questions and 
therefore methodology.114  Working over defined time spans and 
sometimes in conjunction with scientists, researchers can then 
explore the interaction between human activities such as land, 
resource and energy use and the environment itself.115   
 
Depending on the landscape and period under consideration, there is 
clear potential for both classic and novel analyses of law to contribute 
to studies of this sort. Indeed, environmental historians often touch 
on law and regulation, albeit usually in ways which would seem 
simplistic to legal scholars.116 Doing so would not require a radical shift 
in legal methodology: rather, it would require starting from 
alternative premises and resetting what many environmental law 
scholars already do in a different context. As outlined by Fisher, Lange 
and Scotford,117 the overall objective of modern environmental law 
scholarship can be characterised as the analysis, using a range of 
different methodologies, of ‘the law concerned with environmental 
problems.’118 This is, of course, an extremely broad and inclusive 
objective but it can be broken down further.  They do this in a 
taxonomy of broad research questions that environmental law 
scholars might ask, which is centred on three main headings: the 
                                                          
114 See for example BW Clapp An Environmental History of Britain Since the Industrial Revolution (London and 
New York: Longman, 1994); IG Simmonds An Environmental History of Great Britain from 10,000 Years Ago to 
the Present (Edinburgh: EUP, 2001); and J Sheail An Environmental History of Twentieth Century Britain 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). Roberts takes a long term approach, and combines natural and 
human histories to arrive at his research questions: see Roberts ibid, chapter 1. Worster has sought to link the 
environment with religious, political and ethical traditions: see D Worster ‘Nature, Liberty and Equality’ in 
Swearer (ed), above n 102, pp 37 - 47.  
115 For example, see P.Warde Energy Consumption in England and Wales, 1500-2000 (Naples: CNR, 2008). 
116 For example, Clapp, above n 114, makes frequent reference to environmental legislation without analysis of 
either its substance or of its effectiveness as a means of influencing human impact on the environment. 
117 Fisher, Lange and Scotford, above n 45, pp 18-20. 
118 Ibid, p 18.  
Page 33 of 48 
 
nature of the environmental issue in dispute; the relevant legal 
concepts; and the application of relevant law to particular 
environmental problems.119  Within these general headings, there are 
wide ranging research issues, some of which might be viewed as being 
predominantly socio-legal and others as doctrinal: for example, the 
analysis of conflicts between the different parties involved in 
environmental disputes; the role and power of the state or business 
interests; the way in which law and regulatory systems can shape 
understandings of scientific or environmental issues; the analysis of 
relevant law, which can be combined with comparative and cultural 
perspectives; the effectiveness of legal provision; and the role of law 
reform in effecting social change.120   
 
It is not difficult to see how historical analysis of these sorts of issues, 
combining doctrinal and socio-legal approaches, could make a 
valuable contribution to, for example, deepening understanding of 
the environmental history of industrial development. By linking with 
environmental historians or utilising their methodologies, legal 
scholars could therefore develop their specialism and add value to 
inter-disciplinary environmental debate.  Nor should it be thought that 
historically-based studies are irrelevant to modern science and policy 
making. As Smout has argued persuasively, ‘history is certainly 
relevant, simply because environmental change by definition is 
something that happens historically, over time, and to ignore a time 
dimension is to deprive its study from its context.’121  
 
                                                          
119 Ibid, p 19. 
120 Ibid.  
121 TC Smout Exploring Environmental History: Selected Essays (Edinburgh: EUP, 2009) p 5. 
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Second, the centrality of storytelling, or narrative, in the humanities 
also provides valuable insights for environmental law scholarship. The 
humanities know it to be a refined and powerful disciplinary tool 
which can change people’s actions and influence future events.  
Through story, complex issues and truths are brought and carried 
along together in a way which has deep cultural resonance, and which 
is accessible and made significant for ordinary people.122  There is also 
a fundamental distinction between scientific method and narrative: 
the former separates and tests its subjects individually, while the 
latter brings together and connects a multiplicity of issues. The 
humanities can therefore make a valuable contribution by 
contextualising and popularising scientific research through narrative: 
both methods can complement each other synergistically.123 
 
Again, it is possible to see how legal scholarship can draw on this 
insight and contribute to the dynamic.  Clearly, environmental law 
scholarship is not fictional storytelling.  It is, however, narrative and 
its inter-relationship with the environmental humanities can be 
located within Cover’s cultural theory of nomos.124  According to this, 
the nomos is the normative universe which we inhabit, and of which 
law is part: within it, ‘the rules and principles of justice, the formal 
institutions of law, and the conventions of a social order’ are 
important, but nonetheless form only a ‘small part of the normative 
universe that ought to claim our attention.’125  Fundamental to 
the nomos is narrative. In the legal context, ‘no set of legal institutions 
                                                          
122 For discussion, see Griffiths, above n 102, p 4; and L Robin and D Connell ‘History and the Environment’ in 
RQ Grafton, L Robin and R Wasson (eds) Understanding the Environment: Bridging the Disciplinary Divides 
(Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2005) pp 11-12. See also J Shaw ‘Story Streams: Stories and 
their Tellers’ in J Shaw, P Kelly and LE Samler (eds) Storytelling: Critical and Creative Approaches (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
123 Griffiths, above n 102, p 4. 
124 R Cover ‘Nomos and Narrative’ 97(4) [1983] Harvard Law Review 4 
125 Ibid, p 4. 
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or prescriptions exist apart from the narratives that locate it and give 
it meaning.’126 Narratives therefore give meaning to the law and 
become a world which we inhabit, rather than a mere system of 
norms: in this way, law and narrative are ‘inseparably related.’127 
Cover argued that every prescription (including legal ones) needs to 
be located in the normative universe, as must the humanities.128 In 
this context, environmental law scholars can therefore seek to link 
legal analysis and environmental humanities within the broader 
narrative universe.  How can this be done?  One way is to recognise 
that legal scholarship, as narrative, also has the potential to perform 
the same important function as story.  The narrative of law and its 
scholarship is part of society’s relationship with environmental 
change.  Socio-legal scholarship can provide narratives which bring 
together complex legal and non-legal issues relating to environmental 
problems and the human conflicts associated with them.  It can 
challenge assumptions and orthodoxies by, for example, highlighting 
the distinction between political or scientific narratives and the 
normative reality of what has been enacted as law.  It can draw out 
and evaluate the vested interests, imbalances of power and 
commercial, political and scientific dynamics that shape human 
interaction with the environment through legal and regulatory 
structures and processes.  By so doing, albeit in a different way from 
storytelling narratives, environmental law scholarship can also 
complement scientific method because it can combine and synthesise 
a wide range of themes and issues, make valuable connections and 
provide insights: moreover, as with historical research, it is not 
impenetrably technical and is therefore accessible to a wide range of 
disciplines and readers.  
                                                          
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid, p 5. 
128 Ibid. 
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The third contribution that the humanities can make in discourse with 
science is that they are able to set science and its methods in broader 
human and social contexts, and by so doing provide valuable critiques 
of them.129 Clearly, environmental law scholarship cannot do this in 
the way that for example, the philosophy of science can.130 But there 
are perhaps ways in which lawyers can provide valuable lateral and 
reflective critiques of scientific method.  In this context, John and 
Sharron McEldowney have made a powerful call for the further 
development of a truly interdisciplinary reflexive discourse between 
environmental lawyers and scientists.131 They examine the ways in 
which collaboration between scientists and lawyers has played a key 
role in the development of both classic environmental law such as 
nuisance and public health legislation and novel environmental law.132 
While many of their arguments focus on outlining the importance of 
environmental law scholars cultivating a proper appreciation of the 
centrality of science in the development of environmental law, they 
also highlight the potential that interdisciplinary and holistic working 
involving environmental lawyers, scientists and others has in giving 
‘rise to an accountable and qualitative analysis in the functioning of 
the science base as part of its application in environmental law.’133 
That is, environmental law scholars can use legal methodologies to 
make a valuable contribution to science and to wider holistic debate 
and understanding, rather than remaining within the comfort zone of 
the legal space. The McEldowneys go on to argue persuasively that 
one way in which this process could be initiated would be through the 
                                                          
129 Griffiths, above n 102, p 5. 
130  For discussion, see A Bird The Philosophy of Science (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998) chs 5-8. 
131 McEldowney and McEldowney, above n 1, pp 196-198. 
132 They take standard-setting in the EU water framework directive, the EU chemicals regulation GMOs and 
synthetic biology as examples: see McEldowney and McEldowney, ibid, pp 172-190.  
133 Ibid, p 196. 
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in-depth case studies which could analyse environmental problems 
with the objective of illustrating how interdisciplinary collaborations 
between lawyers, regulators and scientists have either succeeded or 
failed.134 
 
(b) Perspectives from environmental sciences 
The RESCUE report pursues similar themes to those addressed by the 
humanities, although it approaches them in different ways.  Its focus 
is more on exploring the meta-level global change issues that can be 
addressed through interdisciplinary research involving the 
humanities, rather than the narrower question of how the humanities 
can link with environmental science. These include analysing the part 
played by culture, values and behaviour in creating and responding to 
global change; understanding the social processes by which the 
problems associated with global change and the solutions to them are 
‘framed’ socially, and how the ways in which this process is managed 
and communicated can impact on society’s response to them; and 
evaluating and understanding the ways in which institutions interact 
with society and the process of societal change.135  Environmental law 
scholarship, whether novel or classic, socio-legal or doctrinal can, 
however, again clearly play a part in developing understanding of 
these issues.  As inferred above, law is one of society’s ways of 
mediating culture, articulating values and governing behaviour.  It is 
therefore a key part of society’s attempts to frame, manage and 
communicate its response to global challenges, and legal and 
regulatory institutions are vital elements in societal governance and 
change. 
                                                          
134 Ibid, p 197.  
135 RESCUE report, above n 85, p 28. 
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Importantly, however, and unlike scholarship in the environmental 
humanities, the RESCUE report also highlights the importance of 
taking a strategic approach to the development of structured and 
properly resourced systems of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
working, as well as more conventional disciplinary research.136 For 
example, it stresses that research projects should not start off 
internally within a discipline, but that the sciences, humanities and 
social sciences ‘should be integrated from day one’.137  The RESCUE 
model, known as a Radically Inter and Transdisciplinary Research 
Environment (‘RITE’) requires that no one discipline has supremacy in 
developing a programme of research.  Rather, disciplines other than 
natural science must be able to identify priorities that are relevant to 
fundamental research issues within their own areas: this is because 
the complex challenges posed by environmental change, its causes 
and its implications, ‘are best addressed via dialogue cross-reference 
systems.’138  The RESCUE vision therefore recognises that new 
institutional structures and research methods must be developed in 
order to ‘weave’ the insights derived from the humanities and social 
sciences into a foundation for action.139  In the context of research 
methods, this means, among other things, developing new models 
and ways of thinking in order to capture the complexity of the human 
and social aspects of environmental change and the related insights of 
the humanities and social sciences.140 
 
                                                          
136 Ibid, pp 27-28.  See also Holm et al, above n 106. 
137 RESCUE report, above n 85, p 28. 
138 Ibid.  See also Holm et al, above n 106, pp 29-30. 
139 RESCUE report, above n 85, p 29. 
140 Ibid. 
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(c)  Looking to the future: developing new contexts for legal 
research methods 
These are all exciting intellectual avenues for environmental law 
scholars to explore. But thinking about issues of the sort outlined 
above brings a fundamental methodological issue to the fore. As 
already suggested, given that most environmental law and related 
regulatory processes are created and dominated by the sometimes 
competing agendas of policymakers, scientists and regulators, much 
environmental law scholarship has hitherto been reactive to the 
actions of others. Working in this context, it has therefore been 
difficult for environmental law scholars to do more than review and 
critique old ground, which perhaps limits interdisciplinary interest in 
legal research, and in working with legal academics.    
 
Environmental science does not, by contrast, have the same intrinsic 
wariness of assessing future events and has developed sophisticated 
techniques for modelling them: indeed, anticipating the future is a key 
aspect of it. Fisher, Pascual and Wagner have argued that it is 
therefore essential for environmental law scholars to develop a high 
level of familiarity with and understanding of environmental models, 
as they have an important role in delineating and governing the ambit 
of regulatory decision taking.141  There are, of course, different types 
of models, but environmental models tend to be highly quantitative 
and technical.142  To create qualitative models also requires a high 
level of quantitative and computer programming expertise.143  Most 
                                                          
141 E Fisher, P Pascual and W Wagner ‘Understanding Environmental Models in Their Legal and Regulatory 
Context’ 22(2) (2010) JEL 251. 
142 Guidance on the Development, Evaluation, and Application of Environmental Models, US Environmental 
Protection Agency (2009) chs 3-4. 
143 For discussion of the key issues in qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) modelling, see BJ Kuipers 
‘Reasoning with qualitative models’ 59 (1993) Artificial Intelligence 125. 
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environmental law scholars, however, do not possess the skills-set to 
construct their own models.   
 
But there are still ways in which environmental law scholarship can, it 
is argued, break out of the intellectual straitjacket of retrospection.  
Drawing on the RESCUE report’s vision of developing new methods in 
order to build the insights derived from the humanities and social 
sciences into a foundation for action,144 one approach which could 
have considerable potential is the development of qualitative ‘legal 
scenarios’, drawing on the already significant literature on using 
scenarios in environmental assessment.145  Legal scenarios would 
have the objective of exploring the implications of legal and 
governance issues in ways which are relevant to scientific experts, 
policymakers and regulators.   
 
Clearly, this article can do no more than sketch how legal scenarios 
could be developed and utilised, and there are a number of different 
approaches that could be taken.  The opportunities presented by legal 
scenarios for both classic and novel environmental law scholarship 
can, however, be outlined.  They have the potential to bring together 
information and evaluate the implications of legal regimes and 
regulatory systems in the context of imaginable environmental 
developments, and at the same time to involve and be of relevance to 
                                                          
144 RESCUE report, above n 85, p 29. 
145 See principally J Alcamo (ed) Environmental Futures: The Practice of Environmental Scenario Analysis 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008); European Environment Agency Scenarios as tools for international environmental 
assessments, (Copenhagen: EEA, 2001); and J Alcamo, E Kreileman, R Leemans (eds) Global Change Scenarios 
of the 21st Century (Oxford: Pergamon/Elsevier Science, 1998). For discussion of the use of environmental 
scenarios in strategic planning, including in the UK, see DA Farber ‘The Challenge of Climate Change 
Adaptation: Learning from National Planning Efforts in Britain, China and the USA’ (2011) 23 JEL 359 at pp 366 
– 368 and pp 373 – 376.  The UK Government has recognised the value of environmental scenarios in planning: 
see DEFRA ‘Adapting to Climate Change in England: A Framework for Action’ (DEFRA, 2008) p 29. 
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scientists and policymakers.  They could raise awareness and 
understanding of the complexity of the human and social connections 
inherent in governing and responding to environmental change 
through legal and regulatory structures. 
 
The basic idea of the environmental scenario method is that scenarios 
are invented stories of the future which facilitate the development of 
new understanding of the implications of change, based on ‘if – then’ 
propositions.146  Environmental scenarios typically ‘build’ scenarios or 
a series of unfolding scenarios which are then analysed to evaluate 
ways in which to respond to different situations.147  There is a range 
of different possible methods, and scenario studies can be subdivided 
into qualitative or quantitative, exploratory or anticipatory, and 
‘baseline’ or policy analyses.148  Scenarios can also take place over 
varying time scales and be of different levels of spacial scale (i.e. from 
local to global).149  There is considerable variation between and within 
environmental scenario studies and potential for further development 
of scenarios as a method.  Importantly, the development and analysis 
of scenarios typically involves participants from a range of different 
disciplines, as well as stakeholders who are involved directly in the 
area which is the subject of the scenario.150  In this context, scenarios 
can act as a ‘bridge’ between environmental science, policy and other 
disciplines such as law, the humanities and social science.  They can 
bring together different forms of knowledge in ways that make 
complex issues understandable and relevant across disciplinary 
                                                          
146J Alcamo and T Henrichs, ‘Towards Guidelines for Environmental Scenario Analysis’, in J Alcamo (ed), ibid, p 
13; and European Environment Agency, ibid, pp 7 – 8. 
147 Alcamo and Henrichs, ibid, p 16. 
148 For discussion, see ibid, pp 19 -22; and European Environment Agency, above n 145, pp 10 – 13. 
149 Alcamo and Henrichs, above n 146, pp 31-33. 
150 Ibid, pp 26-29. 
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boundaries, which can assist in the development of new approaches 
to particular problems.151 
 
Building on this, there are a number of ways in which legal scenarios 
could be constructed.  It is likely, given the expertise and skills of 
environmental law scholars, that they would be drawn towards 
qualitative scenarios, although there could be the potential to 
introduce a degree of quantitative modelling (which might be of 
particular benefit to scientific participants) through what is called the 
‘story and simulation’ approach.152  The usual format of qualitative 
environmental scenarios is narrative, with a ‘storyline’.153  In the legal 
scenario context, this could be built up using participatory approaches 
to bring together the views of different disciplines,154 experts and 
stakeholders on how legal/regulatory systems might operate in 
complex environmental situations.   
 
Legal scenarios could be exploratory or anticipatory.155  The former 
would start with the current law and legal/regulatory system and 
explore how it might operate in the event of an environmental 
situation, which could be (but would not have to be) what is called a 
‘surprise’ situation, where an event which is possible but thought 
unlikely occurs.156  Anticipatory scenarios, by contrast, could take a 
view of the future (such as the achievement or non-achievement of a 
pollution target) and then work backwards to analyse how that 
                                                          
151 European Environment Agency, above n 145, p 9. 
152 Alcamo and Henrichs, n 146 above, p 25 – 26; and European Environment Agency, ibid, pp 25 - 28. 
153 Alcamo and Henrichs, ibid, p 22. 
154 On which, see ibid, pp 26 – 29. 
155 Ibid, p 20; and European Environment Agency, above n 145, p 11. 
156 Alcamo and Henrichs, above n 146, pp 29 - 31.  
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situation had come about.157  In this latter context, the dynamics of 
regulatory systems and the substance of the law could be significant 
factors in the analysis. 
 
For example, events which have already occurred elsewhere, such as 
the Fukushima nuclear-power plant emergency, could be adapted to 
develop an exploratory qualitative surprise scenario, to ‘stress test’ 
modern UK legal provision and regulatory structures.  Scientific and 
technical experts, regulators and stakeholders as well as 
environmental law scholars could be involved in building and 
analysing the scenario.  The sort of legal/regulatory issues that could 
be explored might be as follows. What UK law would apply? What 
would the operation of the law and regulatory process actually mean 
in context, and what issues could arise from its implementation? 
Which regulatory bodies would be responsible for the operation of the 
legal regime and how effective might they and it be as the scenario 
develops? What legal and human rights would those affected have 
under UK law? What provision exists for the protection and 
reinstatement of the environment and wildlife, and how would those 
whose health, property or livelihoods have been damaged be 
compensated?  What conclusions can be drawn which might suggest 
the need for a change in policy or reform of the law?   
 
There are many approaches which could be utilised by both classic and 
novel environmental law scholars in this type of exercise.  Some would 
require doctrinal analysis of the law’s substance, combined with 
evaluation of the law and regulatory processes in their socio-political, 
historical and comparative contexts.  Obviously, the use of qualitative 
                                                          
157 Ibid, p 20; and European Environment Agency, above n 145, p 11. 
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and participative methods inherent in the scenario approach would 
develop socio-legal technique and interdisciplinary working.  Radical 
empirical methods of this nature could provide a way of bridging the 
disciplinary divide by summarising and synthesising complex legal and 
regulatory issues in ways that involve and are relevant to scientific and 
technical advisers, regulators, policy makers and stakeholders.  In 
addition to potentially facilitating policy and legal reform, they may 
also encourage interdisciplinarity of the sort which is championed by 
the environmental humanities, the RESCUE report and others, and 
promote deeper understanding of how law and regulation are, as 
human and social phenomena, part of the process of environmental 
change and society’s interaction with it.   
 
Engagement with these ideas therefore has the potential to give rise 
to new ways of thinking about how legal methodologies can be re-
contextualised to provide fresh directions for environmental law 
research. Re-setting legal methods in this way offers environmental 
law scholars the opportunity to make valuable and distinctive 
contributions to new interdisciplinary efforts to address the 
environmental challenges facing society. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The debate initiated by Fisher et al is challenging for environmental 
law scholarship.  Their central argument that it is still perceived by 
many in the field as immature is uncompromising but justified and 
should be faced head-on, as should their contention that addressing 
the issue of method is key to its future development.  This article 
expands on a further point made by them, which is that environmental 
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law scholars should think more closely about what can be learnt from 
methodological debates in the legal mainstream and 
interdisciplinarity as part of the process of developing the discipline. 
It locates environmental law at the margins of the wider legal 
academy before exploring the ways in which insights derived from the 
environmental humanities and sciences have the potential to 
invigorate and mature environmental law scholarship by creating 
exciting new contexts for the development of inter-disciplinary legal 
research methods. 
 
The article develops the idea of legal scholarship generally as an 
imagined ‘legal space’.  At its core is research in large, established 
subject areas which are centred on analysing legal principle in 
precedent and legislation and the activities of judges, courts and 
lawyers.  Environmental law scholarship is, it is argued, located at the 
margins of the legal space for a number of structural reasons.  First, 
and without denigrating its often high academic quality, what is called 
‘classic’ environmental law scholarship is derived intellectually from 
core subject areas because the fundamental legal principles at issue in 
it often emerge from them.  It is comprised of research into 
conventional legal issues in different environmental contexts, such as 
liability for environmental torts, nuisance, access to justice or the 
judicial review of the decisions of environmental regulators.  The 
methods used in classic environmental law scholarship encompass 
both socio-legal and doctrinal approaches and are not appreciably 
different from those used in larger subject areas closer to the core of 
the legal space.  For these reasons, in combination with its relative lack 
of scale, it can be said to be marginal within the legal space.  Secondly, 
what is called ‘novel’ environmental law scholarship is also marginal.  
It is predominantly socio-legal in approach and seeks to analyse 
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statutory and regulatory regimes in complex and polycentric areas 
such as climate change. There are comparatively few justiciable legal 
principles and limited involvement by courts, judges and lawyers. 
Often, legal scholars lack specialist expertise in the law’s substance.  
As a result, scholarly activity in the field is centred on policy-based, 
theoretical or technical analyses of governance and regulatory 
systems.  Novel environmental law scholarship therefore has 
relatively little connection with the core subject matter of the legal 
space.  Moreover, notwithstanding the often high standard of this kind 
of research, its main intellectual wellspring is wider governance 
scholarship, which is itself at the edge of the legal space. 
 
This raises major issues.  For if environmental law scholarship, 
whether classic or novel, doctrinal or socio-legal, is at the periphery of 
the legal space, and is never going to be significant in terms of the 
core, it suggests that the future development of the specialism 
requires the creation of successful interdisciplinary links with those in 
neighbouring environmental ‘spaces’.  The difficulty with this is, of 
course, how to go about doing so and, in particular, in determining 
how legal research methods can be made relevant to science – the 
dominant discipline in environmental scholarship. 
 
The approach of the environmental humanities to the use of existing 
methods in developing interdisciplinary connections with science 
provides environmental law scholars with valuable perspectives on 
‘re-setting’ legal methods in new contexts.  They can learn from the 
approaches taken by environmental historians in developing more 
nuanced understandings of the holism and complexity inherent in 
human interaction with science and the environment.  In addition, like 
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storytelling in the humanities, legal scholarship can play an important 
part in interdisciplinary collaboration by providing powerful narratives 
which bring together complex legal, scientific, social and political 
issues in ways which articulate and shape understanding of the lateral, 
non-linear inter-relationships between environmental and human 
problems, thereby facilitating connectivity across disciplines.  
Moreover, there is increasing awareness within the environmental 
sciences that, since human activity is a cause of much global change, 
it is important that the humanities, social sciences and law are 
involved in developing new ways of interdisciplinary working in order 
to facilitate the creation of a deeper understanding of society’s effect 
on the environment.  The RESCUE report therefore addresses similar 
themes as the environmental humanities, but takes a more strategic 
view of the key issues to be explored by interdisciplinary research and 
on research methods. 
 
These arguments then raise the difficult question of how 
environmental law scholarship can develop ways of collaborating with 
science and other disciplines.  As the recent content of the JEL 
suggests, UK environmental law scholars are usually not involved in 
empirical research and do not tend to work with those in other 
disciplines: the focus has been on document-based socio-legal/law in 
context/regulatory studies, or what might be called solo, ‘moderate’ 
interdisciplinarity. There is, however, surely significant potential to 
create exciting new forms of environmental law scholarship and 
‘radical’ inter-disciplinary collaboration through greater use of 
empirical methods. In the context of evaluating scientific method, 
John and Sharon McEldowney have argued158 that environmental law 
researchers could, using interdisciplinary case-study methods in 
                                                          
158 McEldowney and McEldowney, above n 1. 
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conjunction with scientists, develop a new reflexive discourse across 
disciplinary boundaries which, among other things, would foster 
understanding of how the science base operates through 
environmental law and regulatory structures.   
 
Going beyond this, it is argued in this article that the environmental 
scenario technique can be adapted, to create exciting new forms of 
legal scenarios to evaluate the utility and significance of legal and 
regulatory provision in the wider context.  Studies of this nature could 
draw on both classic and novel environmental law scholarship, utilise 
doctrinal and socio-legal methods, and, through the adoption of 
participatory approaches, involve and be of value to scientists, 
regulators, policy makers and stakeholders.  Working with other 
disciplines in this way would not only energise thinking about the 
value of legal research in understanding human interaction with the 
environment: it would be relevant to other disciplines, contribute to 
wider environmental debate and galvanise the development of the 
range, relevance and maturity of environmental law scholarship. 
 
 
